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HIS article focuses on the interpretations of, and changes relating
to, oil, gas and mineral law in Texas from October 1, 1994 through
September 30, 1995. The cases examined include decisions by
Texas Courts and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.'
I. CONVEYANCING ISSUES
French v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.2 was a deed construction case in which
the issue was the mineral/royalty distinction, or whether the instrument
conveyed a fixed fraction of total production royalty, or a mineral interest
(and consequently merely a fraction "of royalty"). A conveyance of a
mineral estate does not necessarily convey all interests in the mineral es-
tate; rather certain interests may be held back, or reserved in the gran-
tor.3 Under a simple assignment of the "minerals," however, "it is
presumed that all attributes remain with the mineral interest unless a con-
trary intent is expressed. '4 An assignment of a royalty, without any fur-
ther grant, does not convey the right to develop, the executive right, delay
rentals nor bonus. In construing difficult deeds, the phrase "in and
* B.A. Rice University, J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney-at-Law,
Brown, Richards & Fortunato, P.C., Amarillo, Texas.
1. This article is devoted exclusively to Texas law. Cases involving questions of oil,
gas, and mineral law, decided by courts sitting in Texas but applying laws of other states,
are not included.
2. 896 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. 1995).
3. Id. at 797.




under" is generally critical in identifying the grantor's intent to convey a
mineral interest.5 However, in Watkins v. Slaughter,6 the Texas Supreme
Court held that the use of the term "royalty" was critical in identifying an
intent in the grantor to convey a royalty, despite the use of the "in and
under" language.
The deed in French was titled "Mineral Deed," and paragraph one,
standing alone, was clearly a conveyance of a 1/656.17 mineral interest:
"1/656.17th interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals, in,
under and that may be produced from the following described lands
.... -7 Paragraph two then expressly described the interest conveyed as a
"royalty interest only" and reserved to the grantor (1) the right to de-
velop; (2) the right to lease (executive right); (3) the right to receive bo-
nus payments; and (4) the right to receive delay rentals.8 The court noted
that under Altman v. Blake9 the rights reserved to grantor in the French
deed constituted four of the five interests in the mineral estate.' 0 The
only interest not reserved to grantor was the right to receive royalty pay-
ments. The holding in French was that a mineral conveyance in which all
attributes of the mineral estate are reserved, except the right to receive
royalties, is still a conveyance of minerals." Therefore, when a deed con-
veys a royalty interest by the mechanism of granting a fractional mineral
estate, what is conveyed is a fraction "of royalty," not a fixed fraction of
total production royalty. That is, the deed conveyed 1/656.17 of royalty.
There were deed construction issues in the case, but the lasting signifi-
cance of the decision will be the determination that a "bare" mineral in-
terest (no rights, but the right to receive royalty) is still a mineral interest.
It is another step in clarifying which attributes of the mineral estate at-
tach to a "mineral" conveyance, which attach to a "royalty" conveyance,
and which are presumed to be conveyed or reserved in a conveyance
which is silent or unclear. In a footnote, the court is careful to overrule
the court of appeals insofar as it had concluded that the right to develop
was impliedly transferred to the grantee. 12 The supreme court re-stated
its position that the right to develop is a correlative right which passes
with the executive rights as previously held in Day & Co., Inc. v. Texland
Petroleum, Inc..13
The significance of French is that there are thousands of deeds which
have carved up the attributes of the mineral estate between grantor and
grantee. There can be an enormous economic difference between 1/656
of royalty and a 1/656 royalty. This case, and the relatively recent case of
5. See, e.g., Barker v. Levy, 507 S.W.2d 613, 617 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1974, writ refd n.r.e.).
6. 144 Tex. 179, 189 S.W.2d 699 (1945).
7. French, 896 S.W.2d at 796.
8. Id.
9. 712 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. 1986).
10. French, 896 S.W.2d at 797.
11. Id. at 798.
12. Id. at 797 n.1.
13. 786 S.W.2d 667, 669 n.1 (Tex. 1990).
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Day & Co., are the supreme court's most significant attempts to give the
industry some guidelines on how those thousands of deeds should be read
and how new ones should be drafted. In distinguishing Watkins, the ap-
pellate court reasoned that the phrase "from actual production" was criti-
cal in determining that the conveyance was a royalty, despite the use of
the phrase "in and under."'14 This reasoning suggests that a draftsman
intending to create a royalty should use the phrase "royalty from actual
production." More importantly, the royalty draftsman should scrupu-
lously avoid any reference to the other attributes of a mineral estate.
Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews' 5 extends the "surface destruction
test" to non-participating royalty interests for pre-June 8, 1983 convey-
ances. Historically, the mineral estate has been dominant, meaning that
the mineral owner has the right to use so much of the surface as may be
reasonably necessary to enjoy his minerals. 16 For pre-June 8, 1983 con-
veyances, there was a presumption that a surface owner conveying "min-
erals" did not intend to convey the right to destroy his interest. This
presumption was expanded into a rule in Reed I and Reed 11.17 When a
deed conveyed or reserved minerals generally, it did not convey or re-
serve any substance the extraction of which, by any reasonable means,
would consume or deplete the surface. This "surface destruction test"
proved so unworkable that the court prospectively abandoned it in Moser
v. United States Steel Corp.'8 as to conveyances executed on or after June
8, 1983, in favor of giving words their "ordinary and natural meaning."' 9
"Thus, the 'surface destruction test' had its genesis in protecting surface
owners from the uncompensated destruction of their interest by the...
exploration and extraction rights of the' 'mineral' owner. A non-partici-
pating royalty interest, however, is non-possessory in that it does not enti-
tle its owner to produce the minerals himself. 12 0 The non-participating
royalty owner, having no possessory right, could never destroy the
surface.
Surface owner Crews leased uranium located less than 200 feet beneath
the surface, which was a fact likely to trigger the surface destruction test.
Under Friedman v. Texaco, Inc. ,21 the surface destruction test determined
ownership rights between the surface owner and the mineral owners, but
the surface owner was also determined to own the uranium without the
non-participating royalty interest burdening his interest. The non-partici-
pating royalty interest owner ("NPRI Owner") argued that whether the
surface owner or the mineral owner was entitled to the uranium, the
14. French v. Chevron USA, Inc., 871 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994),
affd, 896 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. 1995).
15. 898 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1995).
16. See Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971).
17. Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980)(Reed II); Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d
169 (Tex. 1977)(Reed I).
18. 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984).
19. Id. at 103.
20. Plainsman Trading, 898 S.W.2d at 789.
21. 691 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. 1985).
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NPRI Owner's royalty should be applicable. 22 The NPRI Owner rea-
soned that the transfer of a non-participating royalty, "even in 'minerals'
which are extracted by destroying the surface, carries with it no potential
that the surface owner's enjoyment will be disturbed by the non-partici-
pating royalty owners, who have no independent right to explore for or
produce the minerals. '23 Crews argued that because title to the uranium
was in the surface owner, the uranium was not subject to any royalty in-
terest carved out of the mineral estate.24 The court agreed with Crews
and held that because the non-participating royalty was carved from the
mineral estate, it could not attach to a substance, mineral or not, which
was not part of the mineral fee estate.25
II. OIL, GAS, AND MINERAL LEASES
A. POOLING CLAUSE
In Circle Dot Ranch, Inc. v. Sidwell Oil and Gas, Inc.,26 a gas well was
drilled and completed on a single lease covering all of Section 3 and con-
taining a little more than 640 acres. Six months after production was ob-
tained, Sidwell, the operator, formed a pooled unit that was irregular in
shape, its diagonal corners being in excess of 11,000 feet apart, and con-
taining 668.23 acres. 27 Included in the pooled unit were 123.23 acres out
of the Circle Dot lease on Section 3 and 545 acres covered by six leases
on three contiguous sections of land. Without the pooling, the primary
term of five of the six leases would have expired within 18 months. Circle
Dot's royalty interest in gas produced from the well was reduced from
.1875 to .03457735, a reduction of approximately 81%. Because part of
the pooled leases were subject to only a 1/8th royalty payment, rather
than the 3/16ths royalty payable under the Circle Dot lease, the overall
royalty burden on the lessee was reduced by the formation of the pooled
unit. The applicable pooling clause in the lease was very broad, authoriz-
ing the formation of the "unit or units to be in such shape and of such
dimensions as Lessee may elect .... 28
"The cause was pleaded and defended, tried and decided, and briefed
and argued on appeal, on the contested issue whether Sidwell exercised
its pooling authority in fairness and good faith, taking into account the
interests of both the lessor and lessee."'29 The trial court gave Sidwell a
directed verdict. The Amarillo Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
after determining that the issue of good faith presented a fact question. 30
22. Plainsman Trading, 898 S.W.2d at 788.
23. Id.
24. Id
25. Id at 790.
26. 891 S.W.2d. 342 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, writ denied).
27. Id. at 344.
28. Id.
29. Circle Dot Ranch, 891 S.W.2d at 345 (citing Elliott v. Davis, 553 S.W.2d. 223, 227
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
30. Id. at 347.
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The concurring judge would have reversed and rendered for Circle Dot
on the theory that "good faith... is like other legal propositions, in that it
may be conclusively established when reasonable minds could not
differ." 31
The interesting issue on appeal was Sidwell's argument that the duty of
good faith as applied to pooling determinations was rejected by the Texas
Supreme Court in Amoco Production Co. v. Alexander32 by the pro-
nouncement that "[t]he standard of care in testing the performance of
implied covenants by lessees is that of a reasonably prudent operator
under the same or similar facts and circumstances. ' 33 The Amarillo
Court of Appeals noted that the pooling clause was an express covenant,
and although the Texas Supreme Court has not directly articulated the
duty or standard of care of a lessee in exercising the pooling clause, there
are many Texas cases characterizing the standard of care or duty applica-
ble under that clause as good faith.34 The bare language of the express
pooling clause implied some kind of covenant as to the standard of care
for the performance of the pooling clause by the lessee. 35 It followed that
the implied standard mandated by Alexander was "that of a reasonably
prudent operator under the same or similar facts and circumstances. ' 36
This finding did not make much difference to the court which con-
cluded that "the lessee's primary obligation is to exercise the pooling
power 'in good faith, taking into account the interest of both lessee and
lessor.' 37 Apparently the court would now submit the controlling issue
as follows: Did lessee exercise the pooling option as a reasonably pru-
dent operator would do under the same or similar circumstances by,
among other things, using good faith, taking into account the interests of
both lessee and lessor?38 In other words, the facts and circumstances in a
given pooling will determine the obligations of a reasonably prudent op-
erator, but the primary obligation will always be to exercise the pooling
power in good faith.39 The court was again split on the issue of whether
the reasonably prudent operator standard was even applicable.40
Grace Petroleum Corp. v. Williamson4' considered whether a breach of
the lease covenants to prevent drainage and to reasonably develop would
support an award of exemplary damages. In 1980 lessee Grace prepared
a unit designation that included the Williamson lease in the plat, but
failed to include the lease among the schedule of pooled leases. A Grace
31. Id. at 348 (Dodson, J., concurring).
32. 622 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981).
33. Id. at 345 (quoting Alexander, 622 S.W.2d at 567-68).
34. Id
35. Id. at 346,
36. Circle Dot Ranch, Inc., 891 S.W.2d at 346 (quoting Alexander, 622 S.W.2d at 567-
68).
37. Id at 346.
38. Id. at 347.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 347 (Dodson, J. concurring).
41. 906 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. App.-lyler 1995, n.w.h.).
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employee (Wheeler) met with the Williamsons in order to secure a lease
extension and a ratification of the unit. After orally agreeing to execute
the lease extension and the unit ratification, the Williamsons had an at-
torney review the transaction. Their lawyer arranged for a ratification
and for the representations concerning the lessee's future pooling inten-
tions to be reduced to writing. The writing stated: "[W]hen a well is
drilled adjoining the above mentioned tract, it is the intention of Grace,
et al., to place all of the remaining acreage from the Williamson leases
into the units being formed."'42
Several units were subsequently formed and then re-formed, and it is
not entirely clear what happened to the Williamson lease. However, by
1984 about 83 acres of the Williamson lease were left out of all the sur-
rounding units. Williamson obtained an express jury finding that Grace
made fraudulent representations that it would place all of the lease acre-
age into units. 43 At trial, Williamson recovered $25,000 in damages for
drainage and $500,000 in exemplary damages.44 The issue on appeal was
whether exemplary damages were recoverable.
In Texas, exemplary damages are generally not awarded for breach of
contract, but may be awarded for tort claims, such as fraud. The courts
have been struggling to find a coherent legal theory to guide them in
cases involving "contorts," that is, cases in which contract issues and tort
issues (e.g. fraud) are mixed. A contractual relationship may create du-
ties under both contract and tort law. This Grace Petroleum court said it
is the nature of the injury that most often determines which duty has been
breached; thus, to recover in tort, one must prove a "distinct" tortious
injury with actual damages arising from that injury.45 The court found
that even though Williamson proved a tort (the fraud), there was no
proof of any damage separate and apart from the drainage.46 This loss
was an economic loss to the subject matter of an enforceable contract,
meaning a contract loss under the lease contract. The award of exem-
plary damages was reversed.47
Grace Petroleum's significance is that it established a precedent for
"failure to pool" cases being limited to economic damages for drainage,
even when the lessee fraudulently represents that an actual pooling will
occur. Perhaps the case may be limited to its facts and the limited proof
offered at trial. If a lessor enters into a lease (or renewal lease) in reli-
ance on such a representation and loses other opportunities to lease, then
there may be other distinct damages (e.g. lost bonus, lost pooling oppor-
tunity into some other unit, etc.).
42. Id. at 67.
43. Id. at 68.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 906 S.W.2d at 69.
47. Id at 70.
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B. PUGH CLAUSE
Judice v. Mewbourne Oil Co.48 involved the construction of a Pugh-
type clause which read as follows:
Notwithstanding anything in this lease agreement to the contrary,
and within six (6) years from the date of this lease, Lessee shall, by
instrument in recordable form, release, relinquish and surrender
unto Lessor all its right, title and interest in all zones and formations
except those that are then producing in paying quantities. 4 9
On July 1, 1984, six years after the date of the lease, the well would have
been producing from the Morrow, but for a temporary cessation of pro-
duction. The court rejected the lessor's argument that the lease termi-
nated on July 1, 1984 as to all formations not then physically producing.
The court held that the clause was a limitation on the grant, but not on
the temporary cessation clause in the lease.50 The significance of the
opinion is its conclusion that the general limitation on the granting clause
found in a common Pugh-type clause would not render ineffective the
various "savings" clauses customarily found in oil and gas leases.
C. NON-PARTICIPATING ROYALTY
Harrison v. Bass Enterprises Production Co.51 considered the duty
owed by a lessee to a non-participating royalty owner for wrongful pay-
ment of royalty, the application of the statute of limitations, and the "Dis-
covery Rule." Bass pooled the wellsite lease and then drilled a well.
Harrison's non-participating royalty was in the wellsite tract. Harrison
was not asked to ratify the pooling agreement, and Bass never paid Harri-
son any royalties from the well. When Harrison made his claim, Bass
paid Harrison his undiluted share of the royalty for the previous four
years. Harrison sued to recover for royalties prior to that time. The par-
ties agreed that the four year statute of limitations applied, but disputed
whether the Discovery Rule applied.
The court held that Harrison's claim was barred by limitations and that
the Discovery Rule did not apply.52 Before reaching these issues, the
court first had to dispose of the tort claims raised by Harrison. Harrison
asserted breach of fiduciary duty, breach of good faith and fair dealing,
negligence, negligence per se, and fraud. The court concluded that there
was nothing in Bass' conduct that would give rise to liability independent
of the fact that a contract existed and that the only loss or damage was to
the subject matter of the contract; therefore, the action was on the con-
tract.5 3 The fraud claim was disregarded because there was no evidence
of any affirmative fraudulent statement by Bass or breach of any duty to
48. 890 S.W.2d 180 (Thx. App.-Amarillo 1994, n.w.h.).
49. Id. at 181.
50. 1d. at 183.
51. 888 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ).
52. Id. at 538.





The Discovery Rule is a common law concept holding that the statute
of limitations does not begin to run until the cause of action is "discov-
ered" (known or should have been known) by the plaintiff. No case in
Texas has explicitly applied the Discovery Rule to a case in which a non-
participating royalty owner sought to recover unpaid royalty from the
lessee, and the Texas Supreme Court has recently held that it must explic-
itly adopt the Discovery Rule before the rule is applicable to a specific
cause of action.55 Based on the supreme court's restriction on the further
extension of the Discovery Rule, the Corpus Christi court denied the ap-
plication of the Discovery Rule. It went on to say that the Discovery
Rule should not apply in this type of case and that Harrison had actual
knowledge of production from a "smoking gun" memo in Harrison's own
file. 56
Harrison also argued that the running of the statute of limitations
should have been tolled by Bass's fraudulent concealment of the wrong-
ful payments. The court held that there was no proof of a relationship of
trust between Harrison and Bass that would have created a duty on
Bass's part to disclose the existence of a cause of action.57 Moreover, the
same "smoking gun" memo was enough to put Harrison on notice and to
end the tolling effect of any fraudulent concealment. 58
D. OVERRIDING ROYALTY
Sasser v. Dantex Oil & Gas, Inc.59 examined the effect on Sasser's over-
riding royalty under a 1974 lease when the lessor and lessee entered into
a new lease in 1990 without releasing of the 1974 lease. When the contin-
uation of the old lease became questionable because of declining produc-
tion, the lessor successfully obtained a higher royalty and a drilling
commitment under a new lease in 1990. The instruments creating the
overriding royalty made the override applicable to the existing 1974 lease,
but did not purport to extend the override to renewals, extensions or
modifications of the 1974 lease. The 1974 lease also contained a typical
unilateral release clause providing that the lessee could at any time exe-
cute and deliver to the lessor or place of record a release of the lease and
be relieved of all obligations as to the released land.60
Dantex refused to pay the overriding royalty under the new 1990 lease.
Sasser sought a declaratory judgment alleging (1) that Dantex wrongly
attempted to eliminate or "washout" Sasser's overriding royalty interest,
thereby breaching its duty of good faith and fair dealing or other fiduci-
54. Id.
55. Id. at 538 (citing THnity River Authority v. URS Consultants, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 259,
262-63 (Tex. 1994)).
56. Harrison, 888 S.W.2d at 537.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 906 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, 1995, writ requested).
60. Id. at 601.
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ary-type duty; or alternatively (2) that the overriding royalty continued to
burden the 1990 lease which remained in effect.61 A summary judgement
against Sasser was affirmed on appeal.62
In reaching its decision, the Sasser court relied heavily on the leading
Texas case of Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes.63 In Sunac, it was urged
that a constructive trust should be imposed to protect the overriding roy-
alty owner based upon either (1) the specific language in the assignment
or (2) the close relationship between the parties shown by the particular
facts involved.64 The Sunac assignment of overriding royalty had the
"magic" language imposing the overriding royalty on leases taken in re-
newal and extension, but even under those circumstances the overriding
royalty owner lost. The assignment expressly provided that the lessee
was under "no duty to develop the land or to continue the lease in
force ... "65
Under Sasser if the assignment creating the overriding royalty does not
contain language imposing the override on renewals and extensions of
the lease, it is unlikely that the specific language in the assignment will
ever support a "washout" claim. Similarly, the opinion followed Sunac
again in reasserting the general rule that an assignment of an oil and gas
lease reserving an overriding royalty in the assignment does not usually
create any confidential or fiduciary relationship between the assignor and
the assignee.66 In both Sunac and Sasser the courts found no evidence to
make an exception to this general rule.67
Sasser urged the court to extend the fiduciary duty imposed upon an
executive in Manges v. Guerra68 to a lessee in Dantex's position.69 Sasser
contended that under evolving principles of Texas law, the lessee owed
the overriding royalty owner a duty of good faith not to engage in inten-
tional acts designed to eliminate or washout the overriding royalty inter-
est owner. Sasser attempted to distinguish Sunac, because in Sunac the
old lease terminated by its own terms, whereas Dantex participated in
terminating the 1974 lease. This reasoning was rejected. The court stated
that "the method by which the old lease terminated-so long as it [was]
contractually permitted-[was] a distinction without a difference ......
[w]hatever a man has a legal right to do, he may do with impunity, re-
gardless of motive .... -70 The Sasser court expressly refused to follow
61. 1&
62. Id. at 607.
63. 416 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1967).
64. Id. at 803.
65. Id. at 804; see also Exploration Co., v. Vega Oil & Gas Co., 843 S.W.2d 123, 126
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (no fiduciary duty imposed where
assignment of overriding royalty contained "magic" language, but no surrender clause.).
66. Sasser, 906 S.W.2d at 606-07.
67. Id. at 607.
68. 673 S.W.2d 180, 183-84 (Tex. 1984).
69. Sasser, 906 S.W.2d at 607.
70. Id. (citing Montgomery v. Phillips Petroleum Co. 49 S.W.2d 967 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1932, writ ref'd), cited in Sunac, 416 S.W.2d at 804).
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dicta in Matter of GHR Energy Corp.71 which suggested that the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals "might impose a duty of good faith and fair
dealing, 'if the facts.., suggested that [the lessee] surrendered its interest
in the lease to destroy the rights of the overriding royalty interest
owner."'
Sasser also contended that his override continued because the 1974
lease was never properly released or surrendered. However, "by signing
a new lease with the intent to terminate a prior lease, a lessor waives
strict compliance with a surrender clause and effectively terminates or
releases the prior lease."72 The effective release of the lease extinguished
the overriding royalty. The court did have to go through a tortured look
at intent and facts and circumstances to support the summary judgment,
suggesting that the prudent lessee in Dantex's position should take the
simple step of releasing the old lease.
III. DIVISION ORDERS
Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank73 was a division order case
holding that royalty owners were not bound by division orders allowing
the lessee to deduct transportation costs. The royalty clauses in the leases
at issue expressly provided that the royalty owners would not bear any
marketing costs. Lessee deducted a pro rata portion of the transportation
charges charged by the gas transporter from the lessor's royalty. The
lessee asserted a defense based on its division orders, which expressly
provided that the royalty payments would be subject to transportation
costs. After apparently conceding that the division orders ordinarily
would be a defense until revoked, the court held that division orders were
not binding on royalty owners when the operator benefits from an error
in the orders and is thereby unjustly enriched. 74
The El Paso Court ruled there was evidence upon which the trial court
could properly conclude that Heritage profited from the error in the divi-
sion orders, and therefore the royalty owners were not bound by the divi-
sion orders.75 The lessee and the gas transporter were not under common
ownership, but the sole shareholder of the lessee also happened to be the
71. 979 F.2d 40, 41 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1879 (1993).
72. Sasser, 906 S.W.2d at 603.
73. 895 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, writ granted).
74. Id. at 838 (citing Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tex. 1986)).
This holding is not supported by thorough analysis of the facts in Heritage Resources, and it
is an oversimplification of Gavenda. In Gavenda, the case was remanded for a determina-
tion of the amount of royalty owed by Strata and the other working interest owner. Strata
was only liable for whatever portion of the royalties it retained and was not liable for any
royalties it paid out to other owners. Id. at 692-93. Thus, Gavenda stands for the premise
that, if the issuer of the division order makes a mistake in the issuer's favor (and does not
pay it over to another), then the issuer must give up its unjust enrichment to the rightful
owner. Presumably the same recovery based on unjust enrichment would be available
against any overpaid party. The critical fact issue is to determine who received the over
payment.
75. Heritage Resources, 895 S.W.2d at 839.
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majority shareholder of the gas transporter. 76 Nothing else in the opinion
explained how the lessee Heritage profited from the transportation of the
gas. Profit to the gas transporter would appear to be unrelated to the
lessee, unless the corporate distinctions are ignored. It appears the court
may have been more taken with its first reason for ignoring the division
orders. There was a disclaimer on the division order that nothing in the
division order was intended to alter or to amend the lease. 77
The court also chose to ignore the express provision of the division
order which limited liability for wrongful payment to a cause of action
against the over-paid party. The reason given for ignoring the provision
was again that division orders should be ignored when the lessee benefits
from the error.78
The court found that the lessee was statutorily liable to the royalty
owner.79 These statutes address the liability of a payor for proceeds from
the sale of gas and give a royalty owner a cause of action for interest
against a payor who withholds payments beyond the time limits pre-
scribed in the statutes. A payor includes an operator who has assumed
responsibility for paying royalty owners their share of purchase
proceeds.80
Sun Operating Limited Partnership v. Oatman8l presented interesting
issues on both division orders and adverse possession of minerals. In
1931 Jennie and Clara purchased a 1/4th interest in the tract in question
at a partition sale. Clara died in 1935 and left her 1/8th interest to Jennie
under a will probated in Arkansas. Everyone promptly forgot about the
will, including the executrix Jennie, who later signed an affidavit that
Clara died intestate. Sun claimed title under a 1970 lease from Jennie
("Jennie's Lease"). In 1973, Sun farmed out the shallow rights to Oat-
man, retaining a 1/16th overriding royalty. Sun furnished Oatman with
title opinions showing that Jennie's Lease covered only 7/8ths, and sug-
gested that Oatman get a receiver's lease on the other 1/8th. In 1974,
76. Id
77. Id. at 838-39.
78. Id. at 839.
79. Id. at 837. It is unclear why this holding is in the case, or what it means. The
statutes cited form the legal basis for the requirement that interest be paid on delayed
royalty payments. There is nothing in these statutes determining the amount payable as
royalty. Thus, the court's ruling that the lessee was statutorily liable for the transportation
costs as part of the royalty does not seem well reasoned or even necessary to its decision.
The statute provides a cause of action in § 91.404(c) for "non-payment of oil or gas pro-
ceeds or interest on those proceeds as required in Section 94.402 or 91,403 of this
code .... " TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 91.401(c) (Vernon 1993). That provision simply
provides for interest on late payments. The primary purpose of § 91.402 is to define when
a payment is "late," when a payor can withhold payment without liability for interest, and
the effect of division orders. Id. § 91.402. Thus, there is simply nothing in the statute
which makes any party statutorily liable for royalty. The royalty obligation is a matter of
contract.
80. TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 91.401(2).




Oatman obtained a receiver's lease purportedly covering Clara's 1/8th in-
terest as to all depths ("Receiver's Lease").
Oatman drilled and completed a well in his shallow rights in 1975. In
1976 Clara's will finally resurfaced. Oatman helped Jennie record the
will, terminate the receivership and recover accrued royalties. The Re-
ceiver's Lease was not canceled, and Oatman continued to pay Jennie
royalties under the Receiver's Lease.82 Sun knew about Clara's will from
about the time it was discovered, and, as late as 1988, Sun signed division
orders on the shallow rights showing that Sun was entitled to an overrid-
ing royalty of only 7/8ths of 1/16th of production. In 1989 Sun requested
an assignment from Oatman of his 1/8th under the Receiver's Lease for a
deeper test proposed by Sun. Sun then reversed its position, asserted that
it already owned that 1/8th, and drilled a deep gas discovery in 1990.
The issue then was whether Sun or Oatman had Clara's 1/8th under
lease. Oatman filed suit claiming title under the Receiver's Lease, or al-
ternatively, by adverse possession. Sun counterclaimed for title under the
earlier Jennie's Lease. Oatman won under both his theories.
Sun argued that it held superior title under the "first in time" rule of
the common source doctrine. When competing claims of title are traced
back to a common source, the earlier title emanating from that common
source is the better title and must be given prevailing effect.83 Clara was
the common source, and it is well established that the "title of a devisee
under a foreign will duly probated, like that under a domestic will, be-
comes effective as of the date of the testator's death, the probate in the
foreign state and the record in Texas being 'legal formalities required to
evidence and give full effect to that right."' Sun argued that under
Bruni, Jennie's Lease was valid as to Clara's 1/8th, even though the will
was not filed until later, and that Clara's interest passed to Jennie at
Clara's death, so that the receiver had nothing to lease.
The court rejected Sun's argument under the established rule that the
vesting of the title under a foreign will is subject to the rights of interven-
ing purchasers without notice.85 Sun claimed that Clara's will was in Oat-
man's chain of title under Jennie's Lease, so that Oatman was on
constructive notice of that will. The court noted that not even Sun be-
lieved in 1974 that Jennie's Lease covered Clara's 1/8th.86
Turning to Sun's claim that the receiver had nothing to lease, the court
opines that "even if the unknown heirs of Clara did not have anything to
give Oatman, Jennie did, and by not objecting to Oatman's lease [the
Receiver's Lease], she effectively ratified it.'' 87 The court relied upon
82. Id. at *2.
83. Id. at *4.
84. Id. (quoting Bruni v. Vidaurri, 140 Tex. 138, 166 S.W.2d 81, 93 (1942)).
85. Id. (citing Mills v. Herndon, 60 Tex. 353,356 (1883); Long v. Shelton, 155 S.W. 945
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1913, writ ref'd)).
86. Oatman, 1995 WL 92593 at *5.
87. Id. at *6.
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Spellman v. American Universal Investment Co. 88 for the principle that
when "parties by their conduct ... recognize contracts as subsisting and
binding, they thereby affirm the contracts after acquiring knowledge of
the facts which entitled them to rescind." In other words, the court
agreed with Sun that the receiver had nothing to lease, but because Jen-
nie's Lease was not binding on Clara's 1/8th under the bona fide purchase
exception, Clara's 1/8th was effectively unleased. After concluding that
Jennie ratified the Receiver's Lease, the court also concluded that Sun
ratified the Receiver's Lease by executing division orders and accepting
royalties on only a 7/8ths interest, again citing Spellman.8 9
Oatman also claimed to have adversely possessed title to Clara's 1/8th
as to all depths. The real question was whether Oatman went far enough
in his actions with respect to the shallow rights to put Sun on notice that
he was adversely possessing Clara's 1/8th in the deep rights. Sun con-
tended that Oatman adversely possessed only the 1/8th interest for the
shallow rights because the farmout effected a severance. The court stated
"that an adverse possessor claiming title under a registered deed is con-
sidered to have constructive possession of all the land within the bounda-
ries of his deed not under another's actual possession, if the adverse
possessor has actual possession of any part of those lands." 90 The only
cases cited by the court dealt with adverse possession of the surface. 91
Oatman is therefore significant because of this extension of the doc-
trine of adverse possession. Such an extension holds a great deal of po-
tential for future litigation because assignments of mineral leases
following a severance are frequently inaccurate as to the depths conveyed
or reserved. Assignments of leases, particularly undeveloped leases, are
very commonly made without warranty. Thus, while it is important to
correctly identify the lease (which usually covers all depths and all prod-
ucts), it is not very important to correctly identify depth restrictions, or
whether the assignment covers all products, or only gas, or only oil.
88. 687 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
89. Oatman, 1995 WL 92523 at *6. Finding the division orders to be a significant fac-
tor in supporting the ratification of a lease is contrary to the current trend of limiting the
effect of division orders. See TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.402 (g) and (h) (Vernon
1993) (making division orders revocable, terminable at will, and ineffective to change lease
terms); Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981) (division orders are revoca-
ble); Sun Oil Co. (Delaware) v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. 1981) (forty years of pay-
ments did not ratify an amendment to the lease). Finding a ratification of the Receiver's
Lease by Sun was not even necessary to the decision. Whether Oatman was a bona fide
purchaser for value in 1974 does not depend on the conduct of Sun after the Receiver's
Lease was taken. Similarly, if Clara's 1/8th was unleased under Bruni, the effectiveness of
the ratification of the Receiver's Lease by Jennie in 1977 does not depend upon the con-
duct of Sun after Jennie's ratification. If neither the Bruni bona fide purchaser exception
nor the ratification theory are sustainable, Clara's 1/8th was leased to Sun under Jennie's
Lease. If so, then the Sun division orders are just the kind of mistake that would no longer
be binding once the division orders were revoked. See Sun Oil Co. (Delaware) v. Madeley,
626 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. 1982).
90. Oatman, 1995 WL 92593 at *8 (quoting Chase v. Faulk, 297 S.W.2d 341, 244 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
91. I. at *8-*9.
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There are numerous existing assignments made without warranty which
simply list the leases conveyed, and which now form the basis of a broad
claim of adverse possession.
IV. JOINT OPERATIONS
Questa Energy Corp. v. Vantage Point Energy, Inc.92 was a preferential
rights case construing Article VIII(g) of the applicable operating agree-
ment which generally give all parties to the operating agreement a prefer-
ential right to purchase should any party choose to sell its interest. This
preferential right was limited by the following language:
However, there shall be no preferential right to purchase in those
cases where any party wishes to mortgage its interests, or to dispose
of its interests by merger, reorganization, consolidation, or sale of all
or substantially all of its assets to a subsidiary or parent company or
to a subsidiary of a parent company, or to any company in which any
one party owns a majority of the stock.93
In this case, the parties to the operating agreement who were the sell-
ers were known as the "Oakwood Entities." The Oakwood Entities were
all subsidiaries of Sceptre Resources Limited (Sceptre), a Canadian com-
pany. Sceptre decided to discontinue its United States operations.
Thereafter Sceptre and the Oakwood Entities sold all the U.S. properties
held by the Oakwood Entities to Vantage, including approximately 600
wells on over 400 properties. Questa Energy Corporation, after learning
of the completion of the sale, contended that it held a preferential right to
some of the properties and sought either specific performance of the right
or damages for failure to honor that right.
Vantage had no prior connection with Sceptre or its subsidiaries. The
consideration given by Vantage in the sale consisted of cash and the
transfer of 81% of the stock in Vantage to Sceptre. "The remaining 19%
of the Vantage stock was held by the shareholders who had previously
owned 100% of the stock." 94
The court held that the preferential right provision of the operating
agreement was not ambiguous 95 and that the intent of the preferential
right provision was to serve two purposes:
First, it assures its holder an opportunity to acquire further interests
in the contract area .... It thus allows those owners, who may have
been at risk in exploratory efforts which contributed to the develop-
ment of the property, to have an opportunity to acquire an addi-
tional interest in the property before a third party who did not
participate in such risks. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, a
preferential right to purchase ensures that the owners retaining their
interest in the contract area have some degree of control in excluding
undesirable participants who may not have the necessary financial
92. 887 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, writ denied).
93. Id. at 220.
94. Id. at 221.
95. Id.
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ability to bear their share of expenditures or who might frustrate de-
velopment with management and engineering philosophies which the
current owners oppose.96
The court held that as a matter of law the preferential right was not
triggered by this transaction and that the "interests were those held by a
party or parties to the contract. '97 Sceptre's subsidiaries held those inter-
ests before and after the transaction took place. Therefore, as a transac-
tion between related entities, it did not involve any outside party and, as a
result, Questa was not exposed to the risk of "undesirable outsiders."
Additionally, the transaction did not cause Questa to lose any of its po-
tential rights which would have arisen in the event of a sale to an
outsider.98
Purvis Oil Corp. v. Hillin99 construed the provisions under a typical
operating agreement requiring a successor operator be selected from
among the parties to the agreement owning oil and gas interests in the
Contract Area and that the operator be deemed to have resigned if the
operator no longer owns an interest in the Contract Area. Hillin was
elected operator at a time when he owned no interest in the Contract
Area, but was expecting to acquire an interest under a pending trade.
That deal collapsed, but Hillin later acquired an interest from another
party. Several years later, Purvis (proceeding on the belief that Hillin's
election was improper because Hillin did not own an interest in the Con-
tract Area at the time he was elected) polled the non-operators, and a
majority elected Purvis operator. Hillin refused to turn over control of
operations.100 The applicable provisions of the operating agreement
read:
B. Resignation or Removal of Operator and Selection of
Successor:
1. Resignation or Removal of Operator: ... If Operator ... no
longer owns an interest hereunder in the Contract Area,... Op-
erator shall be deemed to have resigned without any action by
Non-Operators, except the selection of a successor.
2. Selection of a Successor Operator: ... The successor Operator
shall be selected from the parties owning an interest in the Con-
tract Area at the time such successor Operator is selected. 10
The operating agreement did contain the common removal provision stat-
ing that "[o]perator may be removed if it fails or refuses to carry out its
duties hereunder . . . by the affirmative vote of two (2) or more Non-
Operators owning a majority interest .... 1 o2
Purvis did not proceed under the removal provision but solely under
his improper election theory. The court concluded that the election of
96. Id. at 222.
97. Questa, 887 S.W.2d at 222.
98. Id.
99. 890 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. App.-E Paso 1994, no writ).
100. Id. at 935.




Hillin was indeed defective and that Hillin was deemed to have resigned
because Hillin did not own an interest in the Contract Area. 10 3 The resig-
nation, however, never became effective because the non-operators failed
to elect a successor operator. Hillin became qualified by acquiring an
interest, and he could only be removed in accordance with the terms of
the operating agreement. o4 As an alternative basis for its holding, the
court found that the non-operators had waived the requirement that Hil-
lin resign. 10 5
Unocal Corp. v. Dickinson Resources, Inc.10 6 provided a road map for
promoters and possible participants who want to protect themselves at
the early stages of showing a prospect. Dickinson developed an offshore
Louisiana prospect and showed it to many companies, including Unocal.
The Unocal meeting occurred in January, 1990. At the beginning of the
meeting, Unocal's representative presented Dickinson with Unocal's
waiver form and Dickinson signed it. The waiver identified the prospect
area and then read as follows:
This letter is written in connection with the review by [Unocal] of
certain geologic and/or geophysical data and/or land and leasehold
information provided by your company.
You agree to waive any claim demand or cause of action, either
legal or equitable, which may be asserted against [Unocal] concern-
ing use of any data or information of a proprietary or confidential
nature which is provided for review by [Unocal]. Such review by
[Unocal] shall not preclude any oil and gas operation or activity sub-
sequent to the review in any area which was subject to the review, or
in any other area.10 7
During the meeting the parties shared maps, seismic data and well logs
covering the prospect area. The meeting concluded with no apparent
agreement on the prospect, Unocal declined to participate, and Dickin-
son left with all of his data.'0 8
A few months later, Unocal purchased some state leases for $540,000 at
public auction in the same area as Dickinson's prospect. Unocal claimed
that its purchase was not improper because it had developed its own con-
cept independent of Dickinson. At trial, Unocal presented evidence that
it concluded a paleo study begun in 1988 shortly before the lease sale and
that it also received new seismic, data shortly before the lease sale. The
jury was apparently unimpressed with Unocal's case, and in response to
Dickinson's suit for fraud, negligence, gross negligence, breach of confi-
dential relationships, misappropriation of a trade secret, and quantum
103. Id
104. Purvis, 890 S.W.2d at 936.
105. Id. at 937.
106. 889 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994), writ denied per curiam,
907 S.W.2d at 453 (Tex. 1995).
107. Id. at 607.
108. Id. at 606.
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merit awarded Dickinson $1,376,000 in damages on the tort claims,
$54,000 on the quantum merit claim, and $2,600,000 in punitive damages.
The case was reversed and rendered on appeal based on the written
waiver. The court found that the waiver was voluntary, unambiguous and
supported by consideration. The meeting would not have occurred but
for the execution of the waiver, and both sides exchanged information.' 0 9
The court also recognized a strong public policy argument in support of
the enforcement of the waiver. Without such agreements, an exploration
company such as Unocal would never meet with a promoter such as
Dickinson because of the risk of claims similar to those asserted by Dick-
inson.110 Thus, the court held that that waiver was effective."'
Obviously the waiver was, in this case, a powerful tool limiting Uno-
cal's potential liability in accepting a meeting to review a promoter's
prospect. The court also volunteered several methods by which promot-
ers, such as Dickinson, could protect themselves from the risk of losing
their prospect. The promoter could lease the area in advance, obtain a
confidentiality agreement protecting the promoter, or condition the
meeting on a written agreement for a share in any future operations or a
limitation on future acquisitions (a negative "Area of Mutual Interest
Agreement" or forbearance agreement). 1 2
Apparently, this court believed the key issue was Unocal's bargained
for right to develop the prospect for itself, as evidenced by the last sen-
tence of the waiver." 3 Although Dickinson originally contended that his
signature to the waiver was fraudulently induced, he abandoned that de-
fense at trial, conceded his signature was voluntary, and merely attacked
the waiver's scope. 14 It is unlikely that Unocal's form of waiver would
be bullet-proof in a proper case where the issue was joined in the context
of fraudulent inducement.
Even in this case, Unocal did not escape entirely unscathed. With the
litigation pending, Unocal elected to allow the leases to lapse and revert
to the state. The court showed little sympathy for Unocal's argument that
it should recover its $540,000 investment from Dickinson. The court
found that the litigation was merely part of the business risks that Unocal
assumed in first acquiring and then releasing its leases." 5
V. GAS CONTRACTS
The Texas Supreme Court considered whether a standard take-or-pay
gas contract is an output contract subject to the good faith and propor-
tionality requirements of section 2.306 of the Uniform Commercial Code
109. Id at 608.
110. Id. at 609.
111. Unocal, 889 S.W.2d at 610 (citing Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853
S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1993)).
112. Id. at 609-10.
113. Id. at 609.
114. Id. at 608.
115. Id. at 610.
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in Lenape Resources Corp. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co.116 Because the
gas purchaser's obligation to pay under the gas contract was triggered by
the seller's production capacity, which was largely within the seller's con-
trol, the court held that the contract was an output contract in accordance
with TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE section 2.306.117 Section 2.306(a) states
that:
A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller or
the requirements of the buyer means such actual output or require-
ments as may occur in good faith, except that no quantity unreasona-
bly disproportionate to any stated estimate or in the absence of a
stated estimate to any normal or otherwise comparable prior output
or requirements may be tendered or demanded.118
The litigation began when the gas seller split up the contract acreage,
formed new, larger units, and drilled additional gas wells with significant
increases in capacity. The buyer contended that the unitization and addi-
tional drilling was a "bad faith exploitation of a favorable contract term
and an unreasonably disproportionate increase in the amount of gas ten-
dered."" 9 The court rejected the seller's argument that a contract term
fixing the quantity at 85% of deliverability was sufficiently definite and
that the "gap filler" provision of section 2.306 was inapplicable. 120
In analyzing how the good faith and unreasonably disproportionate
standards of section 2.306 should be applied, the court concluded that
these were two separate tests. In tendering goods in an output contract,
section 2.306 requires that the tender "1) be not unreasonably dispropor-
tionate to any normal or otherwise comparable prior output or stated
estimates, and 2) be in good faith.' 121 Therefore, if the quantity tendered
is unreasonable, the fact finder could find a violation of section 2.306 re-
gardless of a determination of good faith.122 The court also expressly re-
jected the seller's argument that the seller had the unilateral right to drill
new wells under an express provision in the gas contract because the
UCC does not permit the parties to waive or amend the obligations of
good faith.123
The court did not adequately address or consider the effect of its ruling
in limiting the buyer's obligation to take or pay for gas, while the gas
remained dedicated to the contract.' 24 The dissent was pointedly critical
of the court's apparent willingness to accept the buyer's "concession" that
excess gas not taken should be released. Such action did not amount to a
concession; rather, such action by the buyer had the effect of relieving the
116. No. 94-0278, 1995 WL 453266 (Tex. Aug. 1, 1995).
117. Id at *3.
118. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.306(a) (Vernon 1994).
119. Lenape, 1995 WL 453266 at *2.
120. Id. at *5.
121. Id. at *8.
122. Id.
123. Id at *9. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.102(c) (Vernon 1994).
124. Lenape, 1995 WL 453266 at *9.
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buyer of its obligation to purchase the gas.125
In Enserch Corp. v. Rebich126 the applicable gas contract was executed
in 1980 for a term of fifteen years and called for pricing to be tied "to the
'maximum lawful price for Section 102 ... gas' as determined by the
federal government under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
("NGPA").' 27 The Section 102 gas price was calculated monthly by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission using a formula that resulted in
a progressively escalating price that had significantly exceeded the mar-
ket price for gas. When the gas market collapsed, Enserch unilaterally
began paying at a market rate in 1984. For the next 100 months Rebich
and his predecessors simply accepted the lower prices. In 1985 gas prices
on domestic wells were deregulated, so that there was no longer a "maxi-
mum lawful price." Deregulation, however, did not end the publication
of a Section 102 price, although the price published after deregulation
pertained to the type of Section 102 gas produced offshore. In March of
1993 the NGPA was repealed, and the government ceased publishing the
Section 102 price altogether.
Rebich filed suit in April of 1993 to recover the underpayment for gas
for the four years preceding the date that his suit was filed. The trial
court granted summary judgement for Rebich. The judgment also fixed
the price from March 1993 (when the Section 10 price ceased to be pub-
lished) until the expiration of the contract in 1995 at the last published
Section 102 price. Enserch argued that "maximum lawful price" was the
controlling phrase, which the court conceded had no meaning after
1985.128 Nevertheless, the remainder of the contract terminology, "....
for Section 102 ... gas" remained. The court concluded that the parties
selected this index for their pricing scheme and that it provided a certain
and definite meaning.129
Enserch argued that there were other possible interpretations render-
ing the contract ambiguous, or at least not subject to summary judgment.
In particular, Enserch contended that the contract was silent as to a post-
deregulation price, and therefore upon deregulation a commercially rea-
sonable price or the last regulated price should control. The court re-
jected this argument because the parties knew in 1980 when they entered
into the contract that gas prices would be deregulated in 1985.130 It was
not reasonable to interpret the contract as having no pricing provision
applicable to the final two-thirds of the contract period.' 3 '
Enserch's affirmative defenses of modification, ratification, amend-
ment, and novation were each rejected, because any revision of the con-
125. Id. at *17.
126. No. 12-93-00303-CV, 1995 WL 574240 (Tex. App.-Tyler Sept. 29, 1995, no writ).
127. Id. at *1.
128. Id. at *3.
129. Id
130. Id at *4.
131. Enserch, 1995 WL 574240 at *4.
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tract was required to have been in writing and signed. 132 The estoppel
defense was rejected because there was no showing of detrimental reli-
ance. 133 Waiver was rejected as a defense on the theory that the waiver,
if any, was implied, and implied waiver can only be invoked to prevent
fraud or inequitable consequences. 134
The significance of the case is that there may still be a number of old
"maximum lawful price" contracts still in effect under which producers
have taken an inert position similar to the facts in this case. The opinion
suggests that for these producers there may be an avenue of recovery still
open against their purchaser.
VI. REGULATION
TCA Building Co. v. Northwestern Resources Co.,135 is a hard rock
mining case in which the Railroad Commission's jurisdiction and the
plaintiff's petition for a temporary injunction were considered. North-
western surrendered or released all of its rights in certain coal leases, ex-
cept insofar as necessary to complete reclamation as required by the
Railroad Commission.
The Texas Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act expressly grants
the Railroad Commission exclusive jurisdiction over "surface coal mining
and reclamation operations .... "136 However, the legislature also ex-
pressly provided that the commission was not authorized to adjudicate
property title or property rights disputes. 37
Although Northwestern's permit from the Railroad Commission au-
thorized it to place no more spoil on TCA's property "than that which
would allow continuation of reclamation to the elevation of the pre-mine
overburden and topsoil," it did not determine whether Northwestern had
the legal right to enter TCA's property to do so.' 38 The issues involved
were: 1) Northwestern's legal right to enter TCA's property to conduct
reclamation operations under certain documents; and 2) TCA's right to
injunctive relief to preclude such entry until the merits of the declaratoryjudgment and suit for damages could be determined. 139
The court determined that these questions were not only "inherently
judicial in nature" but also that the Railroad Commission had no jurisdic-
tion to grant the relief sought by TCA.140 Under the facts, the trial court
had jurisdiction over the merits of TCA's suit and questions relating to
132. Id. at *5 (citing TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(6) (Vernon 1994)).
133. Id. (citing Gulbenkian v. Penn., 151 Tex. 412, 252 S.W.2d 929 (1952)).
134. Id. at *6.
135. 890 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. App.-Waco, 1994, no writ).
136. TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 134.012(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1996) (note that TCA
Building dealt with an earlier version of the Texas Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation
Act).
137. Id. § 134.012(d).
138. TCA Building, 890 S.W.2d at 177.
139. Id. at 179.
140. Id. (citing Amarillo Oil v. Energy-Agri Products, 794 S.W.2d 20, 26 (Tex. 1990)).
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injunctive relief, even though the Railroad Commission might have had
exclusive jurisdiction regarding reclamation operations and the determi-
nation of the amount of spoil needed to return the land to its pre-mine
state.141
In Morris v. State 42 an operator tried to avoid well plugging liabilities
previously assessed by contending that he did not receive the required
statutory notice.' 43 The Railroad Commission mailed notices to the ad-
dresses shown on Form P-5. Form P-5 is the organization report which all
oil and gas operators are required to submit to the Railroad Commission,
including their current names and addressees. The report must be refiled
annually.1'" Morris contended that he never got the notice. The court
held that the Railroad Commission's mailing of notice to the addresses
shown on the P-5 was held to be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
due process. 4 5
VII. LEGISLATION
The Seventy-Fourth Legislature met in Regular Session and passed the
following legislation relative to the oil, gas and mineral industry which
may be of general interest:
1. Acr: Act of April 6, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 26, 1995 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 287 (Vernon). 146
Summary: Provides for periodic testing of gas well deliverability
and wellhead pressure, instead of current mandatory
testing schedule of every January and July.
Effective: September 1, 1995.
2. Acr: Act of May 2, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 106, 1995 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 898 (Vernon). 147
Summary: Requires that administrative hearings for the Texas
Natural Resources Conservation Commission be
delegated to the State Office of Administrative
Hearings.
Effective: September 1, 1995.
3. Ac-r: Act of May 4, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 109, 1995 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 909 (Vernon). -4s
141. 1d
142. 894 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
143. Id at 23-24. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.051 (Vernon 1995) (requiring
reasonable notice of not less than ten days in contested cases).
144. Id at 24.
145. Id at 25.
146. To be codified as an amendment to TEx. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 86.141-43.
147. To be codified at TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 2003.047 and TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 361.0832(a) and (g); amending TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. §§ 361.083(a) and (b); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 26.021(a)-(c), §§ 28.029(a)-(c),
and subchapter H.
148. To be codified at TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 442.005(r) and (s); §§ 442,0021-23;
§§ 442.0085-86; and § 442.0095; TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 161.092(c)-(e); § 191.0525;
amending TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 442.002-05(a)-(d) and j); §§ 442.009-10;
§ 442.015(a)(b) and (g); § 442.0155; § 442.016; § 443.008; TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN.
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Summary: Authorizes the continuation of the Texas Historical
Commission and abolishes the Antiquities Committee.
It requires notice be given to the Historical
Commission before breaking ground on any project
on state or local public land, so that the Commission
may determine if a historically significant
archeological site is present and requires additional
precautions be taken to protect historical sites.
Among the activities exempted from these
requirements are:
(1) water injection into existing oil and gas wells;
(2) seismic exploration activity where there is no
ground penetration or disturbance;
(3) exploration production, and pipeline projects at
the crossing of public roads, rivers or streams,
unless they contain a recorded archeological site
or a designated state land tract in Texas'
submerged lands;
(4) maintenance, operation, replacement or minor
modifications to an existing exploration,
production or pipeline facility; and
(5) any project for which a state permit application
was filed prior to the promulgation of rules by
the Texas Historical Commission to implement
this law.
Effective: August 30, 1995.
4. Acr: Act of May 4, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 149, 1995
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 996 (Vernon). 149
Summary: Prohibits the Texas Natural Resource Conservation
Commission from imposing more stringent
requirements on air permits upon renewal, unless
necessary to comply with state or federal law or to
avoid a condition of air pollution. The amendments
also allow an applicant for renewal of an air permit
to be granted the renewal without going through the
public hearing process, provided there will be no net
increases in emissions or release of a new
contaminant.
Effective: May 19, 1995.
5. Acr: Act of May 4, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 150, 1995
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 997 (Vernon). 150
Summary: Redefines the phrase "modification of existing
facility" in relation to air permitting so that a
physical or operational change is not considered a
§ 11.24; TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 315.006(k); TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 5.01(a)
and 6.050); and TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 601b.
149. To be codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§§ 382.055(e) and 382.056(d) and adding § 382.056(e).
150. To be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.0518(h) and
amending §§ 382.003(9) and 382.0512.
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"modification" if there will be no net increase in
allowable emissions and the facility was permitted
within the last 10 years or has installed the best
available control technology within the last 10 years.
An increase in the throughput of a natural gas
processing, treating or compression facility is not a
"modification" if the facility remains within its
design capacity.
Effective: May 19, 1995.
6. Acr: Act of May 15, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 315, 1995
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2708 (Vernon).151
Summary: Creates the Petroleum Storage Tank Revitalization
Program by providing a $120 million loan from the
general revenue fund to pay for claims submitted by
August 31, 1995. Any claims submitted prior to
August 31, 1995, are to be paid prior to claims
submitted after August 31, and all claims are to be
paid in the order received. The law doubles the
petroleum product delivery fee. All tanks are to be
registered by December 31, 1995, and all
contaminated sites are to be reported by December
22, 1998. Furthermore, it requires evidence of
financial responsibility or private insurance for clean
sites after December 22, 1998. The standards for
clean-up are health-risk based. Issuance of a closure
letter for a site meeting the health-risk based
standard is required. The Texas Natural Resources
Conservation Commission may privatize any portion
of the program. This law sunsets in the year 2001.
Effective: September 1, 1995.
7. Acr: Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 617, 1995
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3476 (Vernon). 152
Summary: Permits the Texas Railroad Commission to reject
and/or revoke an application, permit, certificate of
compliance or organization report, if an officer,
director, general partner, owner of more than
twenty-five percent (25%) ownership interest or
trustee of an organization has within the preceding 5
years, held a position of ownership or control and
during that period the organization violated a
provision of this title, a Commission rule, order,
license, permit or certificate relating to safety or
pollution control, unless the violation has been
corrected and all fines, penalties and costs have been
151. To be codified at TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.342(13), §§ 26.346(e) and (f),
§§ 26.3512(f)-(k), (m); § 26.3514(f)-(i); § 26.3572(d); § 26.35735(e)-(f); § 26.3475;
§ 26.35731; § 26.360-63; amending §§ 26.341(b); § 26.352 §§ 26.3512(b) and (e);
§§ 26.3572(b)-(c); § 26.3573(d), (f), (h), (i), (k), (p); §§ 26.3574(b), (x), (y), TEX. GOV'T
CODE AN. § 403.092(c); and redesignating TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 8900 as
Subchapter K, Chapter 26, TEx. WATER CODE ANN.
152. To be codified as an amendment to TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.114.
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paid, or if the Commission and the organization
have agreed to a schedule for correcting the
conditions, and the corrections are occurring on
schedule.
Effective: September 1, 1995.
8. Acr: Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 679, 1995
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3655 (Vernon). 153
Summary: Provides that the anti-indemnity statute regarding
oil, gas, water, and mineral wells (Chapter 127, Civil
Practice and Remedies Code), does not apply to
agreements with respect to the purchase, gathering,
storage or transportation of oil, brine water, fresh
water, condensate, produced water, petroleum
products or other liquid commodities, if the parties
agree in writing that the indemnity obligation will be
supported by liability insurance coverage to be
furnished by the indemnitor.
Effective: August 28, 1995.
9. AcT: Act of May 29, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 681, 1995
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3656 (Vernon).' 54
Summary: Provides that royalty payments need not be
disbursed until the amount due equals $100.00
(increased from $25.00), or until 12 months'
proceeds accumulate, whichever comes first.
Accumulated proceeds of less than $10 may be held
by the payor until production ceases or the payor's
responsibility for making payment for production
ceases, whichever comes first. Upon written request
of the payee, the payor must remit accumulated
proceeds annually if the payor owes the payee less
than $10. Upon written request of the payee, the
payor must remit accumulated proceeds monthly if
the payor owes more than $25 but less than $100.
Effective: June 15, 1995.
10. AcT: Act of May 19, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 705, 1995
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3719 (Vernon).155
Summary: Generally promotes trucking reform by repealing the
Motor Carrier Act and several other transportation
related statutes. Among other provisions, it allows
oil field service companies to provide ancillary
trucking services that are incidental to their primary
153. To be codified as an amendment to TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ArN.§ 127.005(a).
154. To be codified as an amendment to TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 91.402(d) and(f).
155. To be codified as an amendment to TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 911m, 6675c,
6675d, and 6701d; amending TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 670 1/2, 883, 911k, 6519c,
6674v, 6675a-6e, 6687-9a, 6701a, 6701b-1, 6701d-11, 6701h, and 9103; TEX. ALCO. BEv.
CODE ANN. §§ 41.03,42.03,67.01; TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 201.073; TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§§ 152.089, 154.001(3), 155.001(3).
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service (e.g., pipe inspection and/or coating
companies can haul the pipe).
Effective: September 1, 1995.
11. Acr: Act of May 24, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 850, 1995
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4279 (Vernon). 156
Summary: Provides that the Texas Railroad Commission has
exclusive control over safety standards and practices
applicable to the transportation of gas and all gas
pipeline facilities within the state which are not
under exclusive federal control. A municipality or
county may not adopt or enforce an ordinance that
establishes safety standards or practices for facilities
regulated under this Article or other state or federal
law.
Effective: June 16, 1995.
12. AcT: Act of May 19, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 870, 1995
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4336 (Vernon) 157
Summary: Allows the Texas Railroad Commission to
administratively approve downhole commingling of
oil and gas.
Effective: September 1, 1995.
13. Act: Act of May 19, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 871, 1995
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4337 (Vernon). 158
Summary: Permits the Texas Railroad Commission to allow
surface commingling of oil and gas from two or
more tracts of land producing from the same
reservoir or from one or more tracts of land
producing from different reservoirs, regardless of
whether the tracts or reservoirs have the same
working or royalty interest ownership.
Effective: September 1, 1995.
14. Actr: Act of May 22, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 895, 1995
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4415 (Vernon).159
Summary: Entitles high-cost gas wells, as defined by the federal
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, spudded or
completed between September 1, 1996, and August
31, 2002, to receive a reduction in the gas
production tax for up to 120 consecutive months (10
years), beginning on the first day of production, or
until the cumulative value of the tax reduction
equals fifty percent (50%) of the drilling and
completion costs for the well, whichever occurs first.
The amount of the tax reduction is calculated by
subtracting from the tax rate the product of that tax
rate times the ratio of drilling and completion costs
for the well to twice the median drilling and
156. To be codified as an amendment to TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6053-1.
157. To be codified as an amendment to TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 85.046(b) and
86.012 (b).
158. To be codified at TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 85.046(c).
159. To be codified as an amendment to TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 201.057.
1996] 1201
SMU LAW REVIEW
completion costs for high cost wells for the previous
state fiscal year. (amount of tax reduction = tax rate
x (drilling and completion costs + (2 x median
drilling & completion costs) The effective tax rate
may not be reduced below zero. Thus, a well could
be fully tax exempt, if the costs of drilling and
completing that well exceed 200% of the state
median cost. Median drilling and completion costs
are to be determined by the Comptroller after
March 1 of each year, based on the filing of an
application for tax exemption or refund under this
Section. The application, for wells spudded or
completed after September 1, 1995, must contain a
report of the drilling and completion costs incurred
for each well, as specified by the Comptroller. The
information pertaining to individual wells is to
remain confidential.
Effective: September 1, 1995.
15. AcT: Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 937, 1995
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4706 (Vernon). 160
Summary: Authorizes the School Land Board to allow the
surface owners of Permanent School Fund lands to
waive their rights and duties as state agents and to
lease those lands for the purpose of exploring for
and producing oil and gas and other minerals,
provided that the surface owner also waives all
rights to receive any part of the bonus, rental,
royalty or other consideration accruing to the lessor.
A surface owner may not lease to any person
related within the second degree of consanguinity or
affinity (i.e., parents, siblings, children, aunts, uncles,
nieces, nephews or first cousins). Upon request, the
School Land Board may approve leases to persons
within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity.
Effective: September 1, 1995.
16. Acr: Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 986, 1995
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4956 (Vernon).161
Summary: Creates a voluntary cleanup program under the
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission
(TNRCC). The program is to provide incentive to
remediate properties by removing liability of lenders
and future landowners. The program requires
applicants to pay the TNRCC's reasonable review
and oversight costs, plus a $1,000 filing fee. The
terms of the voluntary cleanup agreement are to be
negotiated between the owner and the TNRCC.
160. To be codified at TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 52.190 & 53.081, and to be
codified as an amendment to TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 53.074(a).
161. To be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 361.601-361.613; and to
be codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 361.133(b) & (c).
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While the property is in the program, the TNRCC is
prohibited from initiating an enforcement action
regarding the subject of cleanups. Upon completion
of the cleanup program, the TNRCC will issue a
certificate of completion, acknowledging the
protection from liability for future landowners and
lenders. This certificate of completion will be filed
in the real property records of the county in which
the property is located.
Effective: September 1, 1995.
17. Acr: Act of May 23, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 989, 1995
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4962 (Vernon).162
Summary: Creates Texas Experimental Research and Recovery
Activity (TERRA) within the Texas Railroad
Commission to inventory mechanically sound and
nonpolluting well bores which would otherwise have
been plugged, and to allow mineral interest owners
of such well bores to transfer the inactive wells into
TERRA, along with a payment of up to 75% of the
estimated plugging costs. In consideration for
transferring the inactive well into TERRA, the
Texas Railroad Commission will forbear enforcing
the well owner's compliance with otherwise
applicable rules regarding maintenance and plugging
of inactive wells. The Texas Railroad Commission
may then license out accepted wells for collection of
data, production testing, or developmental research
on recovery techniques, each of which must have
reasonable potential to increase the recovery of
hydrocarbons from the tract on which the well bores
are located. The license holder may sell
hydrocarbons produced during a production test and
distribute the proceeds as provided in the statute,
including up to one-half of the proceeds on lands in
which the mineral interest is privately held.
Effective: January 1, 1996.
18. Acr: Act of May 17, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 1007, 1995
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5045 (Vernon). 163
Summary: Permits the School Land Board to reduce the
royalty rate for reservoirs producing 15 barrels of oil
per well per day or less to not less than one-
sixteenth (6.25%) for up to two years. The royalty
rate for the state's share on relinquishment lands is
reduced to one thirty-second (3.125%), provided
that the owner's rate is also reduced in the same
proportion. These royalty rate reductions shall be
162. To be codified at TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. ch. 93.
163. To be codified at TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 32.067 and TEX. EDUC. CODE
ANN. § 55.84.
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for two years, unless extended by the School Land
Board for additional two year periods.
Effective: June 17, 1995.
